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In 1974 Congress passed and the President signed Public Law 93-409,
the Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act. This act represented
a major public initiative to promote widespread solar energy utilization.
A major goal of that program was acceptance of solar thermal technologies
in the residential sector.
This paper summarizes the results of nearly three years of study of
the institutional factors influencing solar acceptance in a variety of
settings. In particular it presents an institutional analysis of the
Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Program in the residential sec-
tor. The paper presents a coherent picture of the program's design,
implementation, and outcomes in order to promote an understanding of
the implications of each for the design of programs to facilitate rapid ac-
ceptance of innovations such as photovoltaics in the residential sector.
THE ANALYTIC APPROACH
Institutional analysis assumes the existence of a variety of insti-
tutional entities and holds that the data on factors influencing innova-
tion acceptance (and, by implication, resistance and/or rejections) lie
in the exchanges between and among those entities (nature, rate, force,
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frequency, etc.). Such exchanges occur within institutional arenas,
which are described by the range and inclusiveness of the exchanges. In-
stitutional analysis assumes that there are multiple currencies of ex-
change, each of which must be noted and is, to some extent, a factor in
decision behavior. This is contrary to market analysis, which operates
on the assumption that decision behavior can be adequately modeled in
terms of willingness to make monetary exchanges. An understanding of
the full range of institutional issues allows for a program design in-
corporating activities aimed at multiple exchange relationships. Such a
program is more likely to be effective than market or any noninterven-
tion approach.
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Curve 1 in Figure 1 shows innovation acceptance without deliberate
intervention. Curve 2 shows acceptance using a market intervention strat-
egy. Basically, a market strategy moves the initiation of the acceptance
curve ahead in time, but does not influence the rate or volume once it
has begun. Curve 3 shows acceptance using an institutional intervention
strategy. Acceptance activities begin sooner, at a more rapid rate, and
with a higher final proportion of acceptance.
Table 1 describes housing as a sector characterized by multiple
stages, actors, and constraints. Housing activity is very time- and place-
specific, more so than other sectors, which have a relative uniformity
of behavior regardless of time or location of activity. Therefore, while
the stages, actors, and constraints shown on Table 1 represent the sector
in general terms, specific manifestations of housing activity vary enor-
mously from place to place and from time to time.
If "acceptance" means making something new a routine, then a meas-
ure of general acceptance of a solar technology in housing would be that
it appears in the notation of routine of each of the actors, from the
four-year-old's rough crayon drawing of "my house" to the architect's
elegantly presented grand scheme for a home or from the contractor's
back-of-the-envelope notes for a materials order to the supoly company's
annual catalogue.
The goal of the institutional analysis of housing, in relation to
the design of a program to facilitate an innovation's acceptance as
routine, is to understand just what is considered routine in the resi-
dential sector.
THE SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING DEMONSTRATION
Before the early 1970s Congress paid little attention to solar
energy. (The chronology in Appendix I presents key dates and events
associated with the SHAC program.) In 1971 the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics (S&A) organized a Task Force on Energy which operated
parallel to an NSF/NASA Solar Energy Panel. Both organizations reported
positively on solar potential by late 1972 and made favorable reference
to the state of existing solar thermal technology and its adaptability
to residential use.
S&A's Subcommittee on Energy conducted hearings on solar energy tech-
nologies in June, 1973. These led to support for expanded federal solar
programs; and in October, 1973 the Subcommittee's chair, McCormick of
Washington, submitted a technology-oriented solar bill. The bill pro-
vided key roles for several agencies including NASA, NSF, NBS, DOD, and
HUD. In November Senator Cranston of California, whose primary committee
was Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, submitted a housing-oriented
solar bill.
The oil-embargo energy crisis of that winter prompted rapid consid-
eration of the bills. An amended version of McCormick's bill passed the
House in February, 1974. The bill called for a demonstration of the
potential for commercialization of solar energy from the point of view of
technology development. It provided that NASA take a key role in guiding
that development. In March the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences reported the House bill to the Senate. The new bill sub-
stituted similar technology development language from a companion Senate
5bill which had been introduced by Senators Moss and Weicker. The House
bill was then referred to four Senate Committees: Commerce; Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs; Labor and Public Welfare; and Interior and
Insular Affairs. The multiple referrals reflected the bill's several
policy dimensions as well as considerations of jurisdictional controls.
Subcommittees of the first three Senate committees conducted hearings.
By May the language for a Senate version, which emphasized the housing
dimensions of the program, were agreed upon; and on May 21 the bill passed
the Senate. By the end of August, both houses had concurred with a Con-
ference Committee report, and on September 3, 1974 President Ford signed
the bill.
In its final form the Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act
emphasized both technology development and use in the housing sector.
Points that could not logically entertain both objectives were glossed
over by appropriately vague language. NASA and HUD were both given key
roles, and ERDA was named in anticipation of its imminent creation.
SHAC Program Design
From September through December, 1974 NASA and HUD collaborated with
NBS, DOD, and NSF to prepare the program plan required by the legislation.
In January, 1975 ERDA was established. Two months later, in March, the
new agency issued ERDA 23, its national plan for the Solar Heating and
Cooling Demonstration Program (Appendix II). SHAC identified a number of
major activities -- research and development; development in support of
demonstrations; residential demonstrations; commercial demonstrations;
data collection; and solar energy use in federal buildings -- and a num-
ber of participants. HUD would take the lead in residential demonstra-
tions; ERDA and NASA were assigned direct responsibility for most of the
remaining tasks. Especially important was NASA's assignment for instru-
mentation, data collection, and analysis. The range of activities and
the division of responsibilities reflect the effort to serve simultane-
ously two Congressional intents -- technology development and housing.
SHAC-Residential Demonstration Program
The strategy that guided HUD's residential demonstration program
design can be readily summarized by the following syllogism:
* The developer/builder is motivated by the bottom line.
* The bottom line is dollars.
.* Induce the developer/builder with dollars.
HUD used two types of demonstration approaches, site-system and integrated-
system projects. Site-system projects involved matching a number of dif-
ferent systems designed for technology development purposes with a vari-
ety of climates and housing types. HUD decided upon this approach as a
way to address the technology development goal. The choice meant, however,
that HUD had to find developers willing to install NASA-prompted solar
systems. Builders and developers did not readily accept the site-system
approach, and HUD abandoned it after the first year of program operation.
The integrated-system approach had been discussed during hearings
on both the House technology-oriented bill and the Senate housing-oriented
bill. It was an approach with which HUD was familiar, both through its
on-going housing programs and from its experience during Operation Break-
through, an earlier effort at the development of industrialized housing.
In the integrated-system projects, a builder-developer selected a cur-
rently marketed system and integrated it into an existing or proposed
single- or multi-family housing project. Applications for grant funds to
cover the cost differential caused by the use of the solar system were
accepted in a series of cycles initiated by nationwide solicitations.
Through 1979 HUD had awarded over 750 grants totalling approximately
$23 million for about 12,600 housing units.
HUD collected data on housing from projects using both approaches.
HUD also provided certain of the projects with instrumentation to monitor
technical performance. Though most of HUD's efforts were directed toward
management of the demonstration approaches, it also incorporated provi-
sions in the programs for developing performance criteria and standards
and other, related studies.
A review of charts illustrating program organization and data flow
provides interesting and revealing information. (See Appendix II.)
Boeing, an organization with limited housing but considerable techno-
logical and engineering experience, was the major program contractor
and is at the center of each chart. Organizationally Bseing was respon-
sible for program management, data collection and analysis, and technical
and grant management. Data, which are distinguished by their computer
compatibility, flow to and through Boeing.
A look at the nature of the data collected (in grant applications,
progress reports, instrumented houses, and so on) reveals the extent to
which this effort was driven by the technological orientation of the ori-
ginal bill, the emphasis of NASA/ERDA in this direction, and the inevi-
table mesh of Boeing's background with this orientation. Despite HUD's
proclivities to put existing solar systems into housing and, thus, to
develop a commercialization demonstration program in the residential
sector, the instrumentation, data collection, and analysis orientation
characterized the program as one of experimentation for technical development.
The SHAC residential program, then, can be described in the following manner:
* The intent: a housing demonstration program illustrating
the commercial feasibility of existing solar systems in
various residential settings;
* The reality: a research and technology development program,
pulled in that direction by the density of institutional
forces (NASA/ERDA/Boeing/computer compatible data, for
example) disposed to engineering experimentation;
& The outcome: a muddled program, serving the intended
objectives neither clearly nor effectively.
The HUD SHAC residential demonstration program is muddled because
it does not meet either the housing or the technology development objec-
tives clearly or effectively. The program does meet some aspects of both
objectives; and HUD, and its various contractors, approached and imple-
mented their tasks responsibly. However, the very nature of the program's
genesis and the constraints resulting from the manner and crisis atmos-
phere in which Congress created the enabling legislation left a residue
of nearly impossible conditions for implementing a program that was suc-
cessful in achieving its objectives.
The Reasons for the SHAC Outcome
During a period of crisis, institutional entities fall back on
routines which, by their very familiarity, provide confidence in the
legitimacy of the activity about to be undertaken and the acceptability
of its outcomes. In the winter of 1974, the Congress, NASA, HUD and
the other primary institutional entities involved in the solar heating
and cooling residential demonstrations program faced the oil embargo.
A brief review of the arenas in which these institutional entities acted
provides insights into the routines they adopted to create and implement
the program. As shown in Table 2, the SHAC program involved four major
institutional arenas -- federal policy, program administration, tech-
nology development, and housing.
In Arena 1, Federal Policy, Congress is a major actor and money is
the currency of exchange. Congress's major routine is to propose and
enact enabling legislation, authorize activities to implement the legis-
lation, and appropriate specific funds to pay for at least some of the
authorized activities. Congress created the SHAC enabling legislation
in an atmosphere of the national energy crisis. In response to this at-
mosphere Congress followed a typical routine, "throwing money at the
problem." What is more, a Conference Committee, which was quickly called
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Table 2
THE FOUR INSTITUTIONAL ARENAS IN THE SHAC PROGRAM
ARENA 1
Institutional Arena: Federal Policy
Currency of Exchange: Money
Atmosphere: National Energy Crisis
Routine: Propose, Enact, Authorize, Appropriate.
ARENA 2
Institutional Arena: Federal Program Administration
Currency of Exchange: Status
Atmosphere: Turf Protection
Routine: Obtaining and Running Programs
ARENA 3
Institutional Arena: Technology Development
Currency of Exchange: Quantifiable Data
Atmosphere: Engineering Crisis
Routine: Instrument
ARENA 4
Institutional Arena: Housing
Currency of Exchange: Marketability
Atmosphere: Market Risk, Mitigated by Interdependencies
Routine: Word of Mouth
upon to resolve differences in language in legislation, used another
typical routine. It combined language from both bills, despite inherent
contradictions, and skillfully structured the language to obfuscate any
differences.
In Arena 2, Federal Program Administration, the currency of exchange
is status and federal agencies are primary actors. The routine in this
arena is to obtain and run programs with the purpose of achieving status.
Each program yields a different level of status. The atmosphere in which
the routine is carried out is turf protection -- keeping programs, espe-
cially those that yield a high level of status, and working to acquire
additional programs. Status in this context is not equated with level
of funding although in some cases funding may have some influence on it.
Rather status represents the perceptions of importance among the parti-
cular institutional entities in the arena. In the case of SHAC, HUD
clearly stood to gain some status if it ran the residential component,
and even more status if the language of the enabling statute were con-
sistent with the definitions of HUD turf. Conversely, HUD would lose
status if neither of those situations obtained.
In Arena 3, Technology Development, the currency of exchange is
quantifiable data. The routine adopted to trade in this currency is
instrumentation. In the case of the SHAC program NASA and ERDA per-
ceived that existing solar thermal hardware was underdeveloped enough
to generate an engineering crisis. At the very least the stage of de-
velopment did not meet the claims made during the Congressional hear-
ings. Reacting to the atmosphere of crisis surrounding the legislation,
NASA and ERDA pushed for a technology development effort even greater
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than envisioned by the original technology-oriented House bill. The
heavy emphasis on computer compatible data, even in the housing demon-
strations, is evidence of the forcefulness of this effort.
In Arena 4, Housing, the currency of exchange is marketability. As
mentioned in the opening section of this paper, the housing arena is
highly disaggregated and very responsive to conditions in the local mar-
kets. Activities in the housing arena take place in an atmosphere of mar-
ket risk; that risk is mitigated by the interdependencies of all the ac-
tors in the market. The routine in the housing arena through which these
entities interact is word of mouth.
Even this brief review of the four institutional arenas most involved
in the HUD SHAC residential demonstration program reveals clear mismatches
in the currencies of exchange, routines, and atmospheres. Concluding that
institutional entities from these four arenas could readily mesh activi-
ties to accelerate the acceptance of solar technologies is as difficult as
imagining that a business manager of a Teamster's local, a debutante, a
medical technician, and a neighborhood gossip could form easy and pleasant
company for each other at a dinner party given by the head of the Latvian
Communist party.
FACTORS IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF SOLAR ENERGY IN HOUSING
In the course of analysis, three general types of factors prompting
builder/developers to integrate solar thermal technologies into housing
emerged. These are useful in understanding housing institutional arena
routines and especially important for designing programs that can con-
nect innovation to routine in order to facilitate innovation acceptance.
The three factor types are developer motivation, information exchanges,
and comprehensibility..
A series of case studies illuminated the character of the three
factors:
Friends Community: a 160-unit, semi-detached housing develop-
ment in North Easton, Mass., developed by a nonprofit corpora-
tion established by the New England Yearly Meeting;
Reservoir Hill Solar Houses: a 15-unit, single-family, attached,
market-rate development in the Reservoir Hill urban renewal area
of Baltimore, Md.;
Project Solar for Indiana: single-family houses, identical in
terms of design, size, and solar units, each constructed by one
of seven builders in different parts of the state with the coor-
dinating sponsorship of the Homebuilders Association of Indiana;
Santa Clara, California: a city-owned utility installing solar
units in a new single-family development on the same basis as
electric service;
San Diego County, California: a mandatory solar hot water ordi-
nance adopted by a county for new housing development;
PNM/AMREP: the collaboration of a major utility (Public Services
of New Mexico) and a major developer (AMREP) in the development
of 25 solar homes in New Mexico, 23 of which are in AMREP's Rio
Rancho Development in the Albuquerque housing market.
The prevailing notion had been that money stimulates builder/devel-
oper behavior. The case studies revealed the existence of other influ-
ences. Each of these was a necessary impetus for even contemplating the
purchase of a solar thermal system.
Developer Motivations
In Friends Community, selecting a solar system was a logical conse-
quence of the ideals on which the development was based and was pursued
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despite the persistent arguments of infeasibility offered by many of
the project's advisors. Normatively motivated developers commonly base
decisions on their ideals. In Indiana team spirit motivated each of the
seven developers involved in the Solar for Indiana project. None of them
had responded to HUD's early proposal solicitations. However, each was
very active in HBAI, and became involved in Cycle 3 as a consequence.
The developer of Reservoir Hills in Maryland used solar as the lever to
make his new development corporation viable. The solar grant provided
the organizational foundation for his venture. AMREP was interested in
solar as a potential vehicle for corporate expansion long before the HUD
program. AMREP's idea that anything with a "sunny" character, fitting
the New Mexico climate, could potentially enhance the corporation's
image and consequent market share, not through any actual technical per-
formance, but precisely because of its "sunny-ness."
Information Exchanges
The type, source, density,and continuity of information exchange
influenced builder/developers' acceptance of solar technologies in hous-
ing. The critical information for the Reservoir Hills builder was not
that solar would work but that it would make the development financially
feasible in the eyes of the financial backer. The types of information
(financial) and the source (a savings and loan association) were very
important factors. Information of another type (aesthetic appeal, for
example) or from another source (e.g., information of financial feasi-
bility from the city's design review committee) would not have been as
compelling to that developer.
The compelling factor for the builders in Indiana was that the pro-
ject information came from a highly trusted source, the Homebuilders Asso-
ciation of Indiana. The same information had been made available in pre-
ceding years through HUD's solicitation process with additional prompting
from the state's Energy Office; but it had not been viewed positively,
notably because each of those sources was outside the routine of Indiana
builders.
The density of information was an important variable for AMREP. The
company had been considering a solar initiative for its Rio Rancho devel-
opment for over a year. AMREP decided to act after its Director of Con-
struction had participated in a two-day MITRE Corporation conference
devoted entirely to solar energy. The density of information provided
by this conference was the impetus for AMREP to commit its resources to
designing a prototype solar unit and testing it at Rio Rancho before the
SHAC program had even been approved by Congress.
In Santa Clara, California, a Science Advisor, funded by NSF as
part of its initial grant to use solar energy in a new municipal recrea-
tion facility, provided the continuity of interest in solar. The Science
Advisor became a continuing source of information. He was ultimately re-
sponsible for furnishing new ideas on possible solar applications, in-
cluding the installation by the municipally owned utility of solar home
heating and hot water units in new homes as part of the HUD program.
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Comprehensibility
The more comprehensible an innovation, the more readily it will be
accepted. In the context of this study comprehensibility means that the
actors can understand an innovation because it is part of and/or relates
to the routines that exist. Information provided by the supporting insti-
tutional network enhances this comprehensibility. In the housing arena,
this process becomes part of the basic routine as one of the interdepend-
encies created to mitigate market risk for any of the institutional enti-
ties in the arena.
In the Indiana program, a legitimator, the Homebuilders Association
of Indiana enhanced comprehensibility. In the AMREP/PNM program, a
translator, the vice-president of the solar system supplier, enhanced
comprehensibility. This person was able to interpret the needs and in-
terests of the two parties for each other and, in turn, to create an
acceptable solution in solar terms, solar being a new "language" for
both AMREP and PNM. AMREP's early interest in solar energy was generated
by the presence of a linking pin. An environmental consultant, who also
consulted with MITRE and General Electric in developing their solar energy
interests, linked AMREP to these two companies and provided the critical
first step in AMREP's acceptance of the solar innovation as part of its
corporate routine.
The New England Yearly Meeting, which developed Friends Community
in Massachusetts, is a classic example of a different sort of actor --
the plunger, an institutional entity that accepts an innovation mostly
as an article of belief, and plunges ahead with its implementation against
all odds and logic. For the Friends, technical infeasibility could not
outweigh the routine feasibility of their beliefs.
Finally, San Diego County's role as a regulator, requiring by county
ordinance solar in new development, was simply a continuing manifestation
of the county's routine activities in relation to builder/developers.
The county did not need to expend funds on direct financial incentives;
rather it constrained the options of builders and gave them no choice
but to accept solar.
MESHING INNOVATION WITH ROUTINE
The SHAC program is a legislative hybrid of technology development
and housing objectives limited by its hybrid origin to, at best, partial
achievement of its goals. As suggested in the comparison of the four
institutional arenas, their currencies of exchange and routines do not
mesh. When the routines of any given arena are met, those of one or
more of the other routines are thrown into confusion.
In housing, financial incentives and technical data are not suffi-
cient to lead to the acceptance of a solar innovation. The former rep-
resent the currency of the federal policy arena, the latter the currency
of the technology development arena. Neither contribute to the currency
of the housing arena, marketability, which is passed by word of mouth.
Marketability is influenced by developer motivation, information ex-
change (type, source, density, continuity), and the comprehensibility
provided by matching the routines of the particular arena, especially
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through such mediating institutional forces as a legitimator, translator,
linking pin, plunger, and/or regulator.
Innovation acceptance in the housing arena requires mediation
through routine at the local market level. The nature of mediation, which
aids comprehensibility, can be analyzed in a general sense (as above) but
cannot be planned for in the aggregate. An analysis of each housing
arena is necessary to understand the nature of the mediating routines
and entities that it contains.
Recipients of SHAC subsidies were motivated by other than conven-
tional market objectives. The motivations that prompted developer involve-
ment in the SHAC residential demonstration program were varied but cannot
be characterized as market oriented. The motivations included realiza-
tion of ideals (Friends), team spirit (Indiana), organizational founda-
tion (Reservoir Hills), and corporate expansion (AMREP).
Acceptance of the subsidy does not necessarily mean acceptance of
the innovation. No developer refused the subsidy (although AMREP's
first prototype was done entirely with corporate funds); however,
accepting the subsidy was not a sign that a developer had accepted the
innovation. The subsidy more typically allowed the realization of other
objectives. Because the realization of the solar energy innovation accom-
panied the realizationof other objectives, solar may find general accept-
ance comes easier later on. Being cloaked in the mantle of the success
of other objectives contributes to furthering innovation acceptance.
However, such simultaneity of events could just as likely be an example
of spurious correlation as it is evidence of genuine acceptance.
The probability of acceptance of an innovation increases when in-
formation comes through routine exchanges. Especially in an arena such
as housing, which exists in an atmosphere of market risk, the extent to
which routine mediates the entry of an innovation is a measure of the
probability of its acceptance. HBAI acting as a legitimator, the solar
supplier acting as a translator, the environmental consultant as a link-
ing pin, and the county as a regulator are all examples of routines in
housing arenas which mitigate market risk by fostering particular insti-
tutional interdependencies.
Information must pertain to the innovation, not to the subsidy.
Institutional entities typically assume that federal programs only pro-
vide funds. In this case they saw the SHAC residential demonstration
program as a means to obtain funds and, as a consequence, established no
new routines. The developers who continue to maintain a commitment to
solar energy (Friends, Santa Clara, AMREP) were already committed to
solar energy before they participated in SHAC; HUD funds simply made it
easier for them to realize other motivations that were linked with, but
not dependent upon, solar. Developers who have not continued to use
solar energy (Reservoir Hills, Indiana) would again accept federal
grants, for solar or any other activity that served their own objectives.
LESSONS
There are at least three very basic lessons to be learned from the
SHAC residential demonstration program relative to designing a program
to facilitate rapid acceptance of photovoltaics in the residential sector.
Research and demonstration are separate activities. Research and
related development activities tend to fall into the technology develop-
ment arena. Demonstration tends to fall into the federal program adminis-
tration arena. The currencies of exchange and routines of each do not
mesh. In constructing the SHAC legislation Congress mixed the two,
creating a hybrid program doomed to frustrate the hopes of persons in-
terested in achieving either set of objectives. Program design, imple-
mentation, and evaluation forthe two are different. To be successful,
each objective must be provided for separately.
The design and administration of innovation acceptance programs for
the housing arena should take place outside Washington, D.C. The fed-
eral policy and program administration institutional arenas are among
the few that exhibit a unity of conceptual and geopolitical space. The
density of information exchanges this occasions, the legitimacy this
density creates, and the consequent primacy of routines from these two
institutional arenas create a strong climate of confidence in the rou-
tines. Because innovation acceptance in housing is facilitated by pro-
gramming to match existing and definitionally local housing arena
routines, design and administration of such a program must be allowed
to escape capture by routines that counter chances of achieving success
in the housing arena.
An effective program to facilitate innovation acceptance must mesh
with the routines of the accepting institutional arena. Because in hous-
ing the routine is word of mouth, with exchanges among and between mul-
tiple actors with multiple motivations and maximum interdependencies,
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the key to an effective program is a strategy that allows the dissemina-
tion of information in each local housing market.
APPENDIX I
SHAC CHRONOLOGY
Sources
1951-72
1952
1971-72
Dec., 1972
1972
Design
June 7, 12,
1973
June-Oct.
1973
Nov. 2,
1973
Nov. 5,
1973
Nov. 13-15
1973
Dec. 10,
1973
Jan. 28,
1974
Feb. 13,
1974
Feb. 19,
1974
Diverse bills filed; none passed
Paley Report on materials policy need for solar energy
research
Task Force on Energy, House Committee on Science &
Astronautics (S & A)
NSF/NASA Solar Energy Panel Report
S & A Committee Staff Report.
Hearings on solar energy technologies
S & A Subcommittee on Energy supported expanded
federal solar programs
HR 10952 drafted
NSF, NBS, NASA, HUD, DOD
introduced 10116 by McCormick
S.2650 introduced by Cranston (Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs)
S.2658 (H11864 companion) introduced by Moss & Weicker
Hearings on HR 10952 Energy Subcommittee
HR11864 (amended version of 10952) to full committee
Reported to House
Passed, with amendments by House
HR 11864 - referred to Senate Committee on Aeronautical
& Space Sciences
Feb. 25,
1974
March 11,
1974
March 13,
1974
March 20-21,
1974
March 27,
1974
March 29,
1974 &
April 5,
1974
May 21,
1974
Aug. 12,
1974
Aug. 21,
1974
Sept. 3,
1974
Senate hearings on HR 11864, S.2658
Senate Committee (A.S.S.) reports HR 11864 substituting
S.2658 language
HR 11864/S.2658 referred to 4 Senate Committees
Commerce
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs
Labor & Public Welfare
Interim & Insular Affairs
Hearings on S.2650 & HR 11864 - BHUA Subcommittee on
H & VA
Hearings on S.2650 and HR 11864
L & PW Subcommittee on NSF
Hearings on S.2650 and HR 11864 - Subcommittee on
Science and Technology
HR 11864 passes Senate, with amendments
Conference Report
Senate agrees
House agrees
President Ford signs PL 93-409
Implementation
Sept. -Dec.
1974
Sept.-Dec.
1974
Jan. 19,
1975
NASA/HUD with NBS, DOD, NSF prepare program
plan submitted to Congress 12/30/74
HUD prepares interim performance criteria for
systems and dwellings to White House/Congress
1/1/75
ERDA established - PL 93-438
ERDA 23 - National plan
Oct 1975
Sept. 13-15,
1975
Jan. 19,
1976
Nov. 1976 -
Jan. 1,
1977
May 30,
1977
Oct. 1977
Mar. 29,
1978
July 1978
Sept. 28 ,
1978
Ist National Conference on Solar Standards
2nd National Conference on Solar Standards
HUD Cycle 1
ERDA 23A - (76-6) updated national plan
HUD Cycle 2
HUD Cycle 3
DOE established
HUD Cycle 4
DOE/CS-0007 national plan
HUD Cycle 4a - passive
March
1975
APPENDIX II
SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING PROGRAM
CALENDAR YEAR
'ACTIVITY
1974 1975 1976 1977 - 1978 1979 1980
MAJOR MILESTONES
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
DEVELOPMENT IN SUPPORT
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